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Finally, this book is helpful for connecting the dots after the fact, for reconsidering how such adversaries think and
plan. For example, McCarthy points to
statements made three weeks prior to
the actual attack of the USS Cole in October 2000 by Sheikh Omar’s son, and
also to the writings of Nidal Ayyad, one
of those convicted in 1995 of the first
attack on the World Trade Center: “We
promise you that next time it will be
very precise and the World Trade Center will continue to be one [of] our
targets.”
ROGER W. BARNETT, PROFESSOR EMERITUS

Naval War College

Casey, Steven. Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics, and Public Opinion, 1950–1953.
New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2008. 476pp. $55

The far left and the far right have something in common, especially when their
enemies hold the White House. They
each tend to think that the president
can get away with anything, because he
controls the media and the media controls the public, especially when it
comes to issues of war. Professor Steven
Casey of the London School of Economics actually knows something about
this topic, usually the realm of strong
opinions based on strong prejudice. In
2000 Casey wrote perhaps the most
perceptive study ever published on
presidential policy and public opinion
during World War II. His Cautious
Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War against
Nazi Germany (2001) demonstrated
that FDR late in the war could not lead
the public to change its opinion that the
Nazi Party, not the German people, was

the primary culprit of German aggression. The president did not make this
distinction, but the country focused
blame on Hitler and his inner circle,
whom the Allies would remove from
power. They would not sanction the
plan of Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Morgenthau to dismantle German industry or to smash the German nation
into a bunch of separate principalities.
Why punish the people for the sins of
their deposed government?
Casey takes on President Harry S.
Truman under different, later circumstances. Truman wanted to “de-escalate,”
so to speak, public opinion lest it lead
to World War III versus China and the
Soviet Union. The president, in this effort, refused to call the Korean conflict
a “war,” as opposed to “a police action,” his fateful phrase first uttered at a
press conference on 29 June 1950. This
signal to the American people did not
work out as the White House planned,
as Korea quickly turned out to be a war
by everyone’s definition—except that of
executive branch officials, who inadvertently freed the administration’s opponents from pressure to mute their
criticism, which is what the minority
usually does during a war lest it flirt
with disloyalty. “The administration’s
subdued public posture,” says Casey,
“often afforded the Republican opposition the perfect opportunity to take the
offensive.” Indeed, the public seemed
mystified about government policy, as
one State Department official pointed
out: “Those who approved our resistance [to the communist invasion] in
Korea now find the present situation
completely confusing and baffling.”
A student of the Korean War can now
understand why the administration had
such difficulty containing Douglas

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010

NWCR_Summer2010.ps
C:\Documents and Settings\john.lanzieri.ctr\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Summer2010\NWCR_Summer2010.vp
Tuesday, May 11, 2010 8:49:07 AM

1

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

Naval War College Review, Vol. 63 [2010], No. 3, Art. 20

MacArthur before firing him on 11
April 1951. Could the White House
come up with a line to rival the general’s riveting message: “There is no
substitute for victory”? Perhaps, but it
could not deliver one, since its credibility was largely shot by mid-1951, when
Truman registered 23 percent public
approval, the lowest in the history of
the Gallup Poll. In a battle of sound
bites, General Omar Bradley, chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had to rescue administration policy by testifying
that MacArthur’s proposal to attack
China “was the wrong war, at the
wrong place, against the wrong enemy.”
One hears that Casey’s next book will
be about the U.S. Army and correspondents in World Wars I and II. This
reader would have preferred that he
pushed on into the next war—doing
presidents, policy, the media, and public opinion during Vietnam. For those
of us particularly interested in those
topics, Casey would thus produce a trilogy on wartime policy worthy of the
three volumes on military operations
produced by Douglas Southall Freeman
(Lee’s Lieutenants, on the U.S. Civil
War) and Rick Atkinson (The Liberation Trilogy on the U.S. Army in the European theater in World War II). Yes,
Steven Casey is that good.
MICHAEL PEARLMAN

Lawrence, Kansas

Hendrix, Henry J. Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy: The U.S. Navy and the Birth of the American Century. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2009. 288pp. $34.95

Commander Henry J. Hendrix has written a neat monograph based on his
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doctoral work. He makes two related
arguments: first, that one cannot understand the diplomatic style of President Theodore Roosevelt without first
understanding his attitude toward the
efficacy and use of naval power; and
second, that the existing literature has
not adequately integrated naval and
military historical methods of analysis
with existing diplomatic historical approaches. Consequently, previous interpretations of Roosevelt’s foreign policy
decisions, as they relate to incidents
that involved the use of naval power,
are incomplete, precisely because they
do not fuse the diplomatic and political
with the naval—especially the perspective reflected by the navalist attitudes of
Theodore Roosevelt.
As for structure, the book begins with
the now-common device of the narrative vignette—in this case the “sailing of
the Great White Fleet,” as a means of
establishing the ambience of the moment of the great president and his
great fleet. With the reader now interested in “the rest of the story,” Hendrix
proceeds in a workmanlike and professional manner, establishing in the first
chapter the basis for the beginning of
the “beautiful relationship” between TR
and the object of his affection and desire, the U.S. Navy. Included here is the
story of Roosevelt’s famous action as
Assistant Secretary of the Navy regarding the deployment of Admiral George
Dewey’s Far East Squadron to Manila
Bay. This episode may be regarded as
typical of Roosevelt’s activist attitudes
and actions regarding the Navy.
The remaining chapters focus topically.
The closing chapter on the Great White
Fleet is the only one that deals directly
with the linkage of the U.S. Navy to an
“American Century.” The odd man out
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